When evaluating security or triaging findings, distinguish between these two primary trust boundaries:
Tenant $\rightarrow$ Operator (The CR Boundary): A namespace tenant (user or CI) creates or patches a SolrCloud, SolrBackup, or SolrPrometheusExporter specification. The operator consumes this spec and acts upon it using its own high-privilege ServiceAccount. This is the primary area of concern: fields in the CR are considered attacker-controllable inputs to a privileged process.
Operator $\rightarrow$ Solr (The HTTP Boundary): The operator acts as an authenticated client to the managed Solr pods via the HTTPS admin API (using basic-auth k8s-oper and optionally mTLS). In this boundary, the operator is the client trusting the Solr server.
Note on Reachability: A finding is considered within the operator's model only if it is reachable by a CRD author who is not a cluster-admin, and the effect crosses from the tenant's authority into the operator's cluster authority.
tenant ─(create/patch CR)─► [k8s API + RBAC] ─► operator reconcile loop
│ acts as operator SA (ClusterRole)
├─► create/patch Secrets, ConfigMaps, Services
├─► create/patch StatefulSets, Deployments, PDBs, Ingress, PVCs
├─► pods/exec (create) into managed pods
└─► provision ZookeeperCluster (pravega CRD)
operator ─(HTTPS admin API, basic-auth k8s-oper, optional mTLS)─► managed Solr pods
(TLS server-cert verification OFF by default: tls-skip-verify-server=true)